I’m still chunking through this and related entries, but this was a convenient starting point for me.
I’m generally inclined to think of frameworks of truth-finding as having developed in a sort of taxonomy, like a tree. While groups will evaluate the same data similarly up to a point, say, problems with depth perception and colorblindness don’t prevent people from seeing something similar as conventional-seeing people do, the different methods of evaluating the same data come from context/field-specific standards, faculties, or methods.
If a thing description is adequately modally robust or is true across different viewpoints, that seems to me a good indication it is true.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
I’m still chunking through this and related entries, but this was a convenient starting point for me.
I’m generally inclined to think of frameworks of truth-finding as having developed in a sort of taxonomy, like a tree. While groups will evaluate the same data similarly up to a point, say, problems with depth perception and colorblindness don’t prevent people from seeing something similar as conventional-seeing people do, the different methods of evaluating the same data come from context/field-specific standards, faculties, or methods.
If a
thingdescription is adequately modally robust or is true across different viewpoints, that seems to me a good indication it is true.