That’s not what idealism means in this context. Idealism means “ideas shape reality” whereas materialism is “reality shapes ideas.” Idealism is ignoring material conditions in order preserve an idea, instead of changing the idea to match the material conditions we face.
I’m not the OP, but I would like to speak on this matter and, perhaps get some relevant input.
That seems to be a roughly correct assessment of what idealism is if we replace the word ‘reality’ with ‘material part of reality’ (because non-material part of reality is still a part of reality). However, I see a couple of issues with the assessment of Marxism as supposedly being a materialist and anti-idealist school of thought:
I’m not sure what the argument is for how the ideas encountered in math depend on material part of reality. There is no such dependency as far as I can see as a person with a background in mathematics.
I am not aware of any Marxist positions that are in conflict with idealism. If there are such positions, I’m all ears.
1: Math is the literal representation of the the laws of matter. Math would not make sense if it didn’t follow the laws of matter that we have developed throughout all our history.
2: “The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature is the paramount question of the whole of philosophy… The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature … comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.” (Marx, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 329.) The entire foundation of Marxism (dialectical materialism) is in conflict with the foundation of idealism.
Math is the literal representation of the the laws of matter
It is not, especially not in the sense of math as what mathematicians study, but, again, math as an academic discipline is also not that. Math as an academic discipline says nothing about matter. Physics and chemistry (as academic disciplines) do.
In an academic work of physics, you would encounter passages like ‘a body’s movement can be described this way’, or ‘spectral analysis indicates that this planet’s atmosphere has such-and-such gases’.
In an academic work of chemistry, you would encounter passages like ‘when mixed, these two substances enter a reaction the result of which are these substances’.
In an academic work of math, you would instead encounter passages like ‘the annulus of convergence of this Laurent series has such-and-such radii’, or ‘this surface has this Euler characteristic’, or ‘this shape is a wild embedding of a sphere into R^3’.
Unlike bodies of matter, planets and their atmospheres, substances, etc., none of the objects mentioned in the quotes in that last part are material.
Math would not make sense if it didn’t follow the laws of matter that we have developed throughout all our history
It’s the other way around, however. Math as what mathematicians study is not dependent on matter in any way (if you disagree, you can try exploring what properties matter would need to have to, for example, annihilate the idea of the field of rational numbers). Meanwhile, if a material system works in a way that corresponds to some non-self-contradictory system found in math, it is not going to produce any results that would somehow cause a contradiction in the math system, so long as the material system works in accordance with the correspondence to the math system. You are not going to, for example, start out with 2 apples, give one apple to your comrade and be left with 3 apples, so long as giving an apple corresponds to subtracting 1 from a natural number that starts out as the count of how many apples you have and so long as there are no other ways to change how many apples you have.
The entire foundation of Marxism (dialectical materialism) is in conflict with the foundation of idealism
I am yet to encounter any conflicts in this regard. I have been unable to find them on my own, and the people that I have talked to so far, including outside of this thread, have not managed to find any such issues. I hope to resolve this matter at some point, one way or another.
It is not, especially not in the sense of math as what mathematicians study, but, again, math as an academic discipline is also not that. Math as an academic discipline says nothing about matter. Physics and chemistry (as academic disciplines) do.
Maybe a better phrasing would be that math is another paradigm of matter, another way of visualizing matter. Still i stand by what i said, even if mathematician studies are seemingly abstract, it is only because we have developed math to a higher stage of development than other disciplines and thus have lost the forest for the trees.
It’s the other way around, however. Math as what mathematicians study is not dependent on matter in any way.
Math does not exist in a vacuum, this is a big difference between metaphysics and Marxism, things do not exist in a vacuum… Math studies have to converge to the currently developed laws of math or it is not math but nonsense.
“Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.” (Dialectical and Historical Materialism)
I apologise for disappearing for a few days. Dealing with stress, in particular due to this discussion, and with more ‘professional’ stuff. I have not read everything in the thread that got posted since I last replied here yet, and will probably not be able to do so quite right now.
Maybe a better phrasing would be that math is another paradigm of matter
In what sense? If by the word ‘paradigm’ you just mean ‘a collection of ideas’ (where an ‘idea’ is any non-material object), then the expression ‘a collection of ideas of matter’ doesn’t make sense in this context without further clarification.
If you mean that it is some sort of a collection of theories about matter, then there are, again, problems. Math-as-what-mathematicians-study is not a theory, not a collection of thought patterns, research methods or anything like that - it exists independently of our minds. Also, not particularly relevant, but math as the body of knowledge about what mathematicians study tells us nothing about matter without application of the sort that physicists and chemists engage in.
another way of visualizing matter
Math-as-what-mathematicians-study is not any sort of way of visualising anything, though. We can use knowledge about that stuff in order to help us visualise things, both material and non-material, like we know how to draw an annulus and we know that a Laurent series generally converges for z within a metric annulus on the complex plane, meaning that we can visualise the region of convergence of such a series with a relevant drawing (or imagine a relevant drawing), or like how we can use our knowledge of the fact that roughly half of uranium-238 decays into uranium-234 within 4.5 billion years or so to make a relevant drawing (or, again, imagine one).
Math does not exist in a vacuum, this is a big difference between metaphysics and Marxism, things do not exist in a vacuum
Not sure what you mean by ‘existing in a vacuum’. In the literal sense, it is incorrect, as math is not a material thing, and does not have a location in any reasonable sense in this context.
If by that you mean that it depends on matter, then that seems to be an assumption/axiom that you subscribe to. That assumption does not seem to have a good basis. How would matter have to be different in order to, for example, eliminate the idea of the field of rational numbers? Or do you have another example of a dependency of math-as-what-mathematicians-study in mind?
Math studies have to converge to the currently developed laws of math or it is not math but nonsense
What do you mean by ‘converge’ here, and what relevance does this sentence have to this topic?
What mathematicians study can be said to be ‘the laws of math’. The study of math can’t be said to ‘converge’ in any sense that I can think of, other than colloquial and imprecise, in which case I’m not sure what exactly it is that you mean.
Furthermore, are there any conclusions that Marxism draws from materialism about society, economics, politics, communist praxis, epistemology or some human activity that I have failed to consider here? Because if not, it seems that we are in the same boat with the exception that I say that some non-material things are non-mental and are not dependent on matter, while matter has dependencies on it, and you say that there are no such things.
I think the misstep that you’re taking is equating ‘material’ with ‘physical’ or relating to ‘(physical) matter’.
Marxists don’t study things, they study relations and processes. So when Marxists talk of ‘material’, they’re speaking of ‘material relations’. This includes physical objects, of course, and also social relations and e.g. gravity or magnetic fields. Money or value as social relations are as material as gravity or a flower; such relations have very real, very tangible effects on the world even if you can’t see or touch the relations.
You seem to be transposing your own definition of ‘material’ onto historical and dialectical materialists who hold a very different definition. You’re just going to speak past people if you do that.
I could be wrong: are you referring to any particular Marxists as a source for your definition of materialism and it’s coincidence with idealism? You say that you’re:
yet to encounter any conflicts in … [t]he entire foundation of Marxism (dialectical materialism) [and] the foundation of idealism[.]
Personally, I haven’t come across a single Marxist who treats materialism and idealism as compatible. Even those who admit that ideas can shape reality (including Marx himself) do so from a position of rejecting idealism. In that sense, just as material does not equate to (physical) matter, idealism does not equate to ideas simpliciter.
All these debates are rooted in historic philosophical traditions. You can’t dismiss the essence of Marxism on the basis of modern, dare I say idealistically universalised, notions of what these terms mean; you have to go back to the beginning and situate the terms in their historical context. That is another aspect of Marxism—insisting that relations are historically contingent, meaning that e.g. definitions can change through the epochs.
I apologise for disappearing for a few days. Dealing with stress, in particular due to this discussion, and with more ‘professional’ stuff. I have not read everything in the thread that got posted since I last replied here yet, and will probably not be able to do so quite right now.
I think the misstep that you’re taking is equating ‘material’ with ‘physical’ or relating to ‘(physical) matter’
But then what you mean by ‘material’ also encompasses non-material things, which doesn’t align with how the word ‘material’ is used in philosophy. This also supports the thoughts that I have been left with for a while at this point that there is no conflict between Marxism and idealism. Just between Marxism and some forms of idealism that are often presented to encompass all of idealist schools of thought.
Also, can you provide a source for your definition of the word ‘material’? Also, as of right now, I do not understand what exactly it is that you mean by it if not that a ‘material’ object is one that consists of matter (and, perhaps, that a ‘material’ process is one that involves material objects, etc.).
I could be wrong: are you referring to any particular Marxists as a source for your definition of materialism and it’s coincidence with idealism?
I never claimed that materialism ‘coincides’ with idealism. What I have claimed is that Marxism doesn’t conflict with idealism (in particular, with the views that I subscribe to).
Strictly speaking, my claim is incorrect, because at least usually Marxists do seem to take as an axiom that all ideas depend on matter in some way, but
I don’t see any significant conclusions that are drawn from that assumption that conflict with idealism.
Judging by how often Marxists who criticise/reject idealism don’t actually mean idealism in general, but just some idealist schools of thought. More specifically, ones that only distinguish mental stuff out of non-material. These would be people like, for example, (some of) idealist mathematical intuitionists seem to believe (as opposed to materialist mathematical intuitionists).
Personally, I haven’t come across a single Marxist who treats materialism and idealism as compatible
I do not treat them as compatible, except in the sense that there are types of materialism of different strictness. I don’t think that anybody here subscribes to strict materialism that posits that nothing but matter exists, for example.
What I am saying is that Marxism is fundamentally ‘agnostic’ in this sense. All of the relevant conclusions can be made in various idealist and materialist frameworks, especially if we allow for some basic rewording. Again, at the very least currently I am not aware of any relevant conflicts.
Although, I think that all the ‘idealism vs materialism’ arguments do lack an evaluation of a view that neither matter nor ideas have any sort of ‘primacy’ in any reasonable sense, considering that idealism and materialism are often defined through specifically the ‘primacy’ thing (as opposed to through what is labelled as ‘existing’, which is how the relevant terms are defined in at least some traditions), and, bizarrely, I have not encountered the position that I just outlined yet.
idealism does not equate to ideas simpliciter
Not sure what you are trying to say here.
If you mean that, literally, that words ‘idealism’ and ‘ideas’ are not synonymous, then that is obviously correct.
If you mean that idealist schools of thought do not generally say that ideas are the only thing that exists, then yes, that is correct. In particular, I do say that matter exists.
If you mean that idealism does not necessarily claim that ideas have primacy over matter, then there is an issue. While, for example, I claim that there are ideas (such as what mathematicians study) that are independent of matter but not vice versa, and that I also claim that there are ideas (like, for example, our imagination and perception of things, including what is studied by mathematicians as well as how that stone that you just threw skimmed over the water) that either have dependency on matter but not vice versa or, at least, that matter has some sort of ‘primacy’ over those, I do claim that some ideas do have some sort of ‘primacy’ over matter. If you do not define ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’ through some sort of ‘primacy’ or even existence of relevant objects, then how do you define those?
In any case, my main point is that, so far, I do not see any significant conflicts between Marxism and idealism.
Thanks for responding. Don’t worry about the delay. At least on my instance, there’s no issue with taking your time, especially with tricky issues that require thinking space. I’m preparing a longer response for you because there’s a lot to unpack, here. It may take me a day or two to collect my thoughts.
I would like to clarify some things. It is not exactly true that Marxism is a materialist philosophy. Marxism is a dialectical materialist philosophy. One of Marx’s key innovations in philosophy was to conceive of a feedback relation between ideas and matter. Matter constrains and guides the development of ideas, and ideas influence matter through human action.
Another aspect here is that this feedback relationship is self similar. If you zoom in to smaller parts of reality, you find new iterations of this loop. For example, you could find a feedback relationship between the legal system and the economic mode of production. But if you zoom into the legal system themselves, you will find some relation between the material base of the legal system (the courts, prisons, lawyers) and the ideal part (the laws on the books, the common juridical worldviews).
I think it’s more correct to say dialectical materialism is a subset of materialist philosophy. It’s not a dualist philosophy because the mental realm is not conceived of as a separate thing. Rather information and ideas are embedded in the complex chemistry of the human brain.
I think the true utility of dialectics to Marx was that it allowed him to intuit how change actually occurs in our material world without relying on the science of thermodynamics which didn’t exist yet.
I think the true utility of dialectics to Marx was that it allowed him to intuit how change actually occurs in our material world without relying on the science of thermodynamics which didn’t exist yet.
It’s more than just thermodynamics. I don’t think dialects can simply be reduced to science (that is positivism, which marx rejected). It might be better to say that dialects is the philosophy of science.
Plus, marx was well aware of thermodynamics. In fact, the whole idea of labor-power was inspired by horse-power. And value was conceived of as the economic analogue of work.
Science doesn’t not have to be positivist. I think most scientists actually understand that. For example the laws of thermodynamics break down at a quantum level and we’re still trying to come up with and test better models that can incorporate that new information.
What I mean to say about the laws of thermodynamics is they are incredibly useful in describing how and why things change. These were not all worked out when Marx was developing his theories. Yes, Marx and Engels were up to date with the science of their time and they make reference to work and power. However they lacked an understanding of entropy if only because scientists had only begun to experiment with the concept. That’s very clear especially if you read Engels’s Dialectic of Nature. In it he explicitly argues against ideas that would come to be core to the science of thermodynamics.
That’s all to say I suspect if those developments in physics had occurred maybe 40 years earlier, Marx would have formulated a much more precise concept of value. Then maybe he wouldn’t have needed to write so much about linen coats.
I think it’s more correct to say dialectical materialism is a subset of materialist philosophy. It’s not a dualist philosophy because the mental realm is not conceived of as a separate thing
This line of thinking indicates the assumption that the only type of idealism is the sort that posits that only matter and ‘mental’ non-material stuff exists. There are other types, including ones that do not consider said ‘mental’ stuff to exist.
I myself, for example, fall under the camp of considering non-material non-mental stuff to exist, in addition to mental stuff. I consider some, but not all, of the former to have no dependencies on material stuff, with material stuff being dependent on such, and that all mental stuff depends on material stuff. I am yet to find any sort of conflicts with Marxism on these grounds (or in general, sans, perhaps, some wording that is used by Marx or other people).
I would like to clarify some things. It is not exactly true that Marxism is a materialist philosophy. Marxism is a dialectical materialist philosophy. One of Marx’s key innovations in philosophy was to conceive of a feedback relation between ideas and matter. Matter constrains and guides the development of ideas, and ideas influence matter through human action
However, why call this ‘dialectical materialism’ if it can just as well be work just fine within an idealist framework/alongside subscription to idealist schools of thought? There doesn’t seem to be any conflict in this regard.
Because Marxists think of ideas as themselves being material things. Marxism is not a dualist philosophy. For us, ideas exist as brains, books, TV programs and so on. There is thus even some interesting theories about how the medium itself changes the ideas. Furthermore, in marxist theories, ideas are not given equal weight to the rest of the system. Ideas are only a small part of material reality.
Mathematics as what mathematicians study is not itself a representation (of, well, itself), so that’s obviously false in that sense, and I’m not sure how representation of it is relevant to its own nature. And, of course, math itself isn’t dependent on what is studied in thermodynamics.
Pragmatism maybe? I’m not really sure, I tend to find “realist” just means “I’m really good at justifying the actions I was going to do already.” though obviously that isn’t a definition.
Another compromise philosophy is known as “realism”. In its modern form, this philosophy has arisen in opposition to subjective idealism.
The “realist” philosophers say that the external material world really exists independent of our perceptions and is in some way reflected by our perceptions. In this the “realists” agree with the materialists in opposition to subjective idealism; indeed, you cannot be a materialist unless you are a thoroughgoing realist on the question of the real existence of the material world.
But merely to assert that the external world exists independent of our perceiving it, is not to be a materialist. For example, the great Catholic philosopher of the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas, was in this sense a “realist”. And to this day most Catholic theologians regard it as a heresy to be anything but a “realist” in philosophy. But at the same time they assert that the material world, which really exists, was created by God, and is sustained and ruled all the time by the power of God, by a spiritual power. So far from being materialists, they are idealists.
Moreover, the word “realism” is much abused by philosophers. So long as you believe that something or other is “real”, you may call yourself a “realist”. Some philosophers think that not only is the world of material things real, but that there is also, outside space and time, a real world of “universals”, of the abstract essences of things: so these call themselves “realists”. Others say that, although nothing exists but the perceptions in our minds, nevertheless these perceptions are real: so these call themselves “realists” too. All of which goes to show that some philosophers are very tricky in their use of words.
That’s not what idealism means in this context. Idealism means “ideas shape reality” whereas materialism is “reality shapes ideas.” Idealism is ignoring material conditions in order preserve an idea, instead of changing the idea to match the material conditions we face.
Then I thank you for the clarification.
I’m not the OP, but I would like to speak on this matter and, perhaps get some relevant input.
That seems to be a roughly correct assessment of what idealism is if we replace the word ‘reality’ with ‘material part of reality’ (because non-material part of reality is still a part of reality). However, I see a couple of issues with the assessment of Marxism as supposedly being a materialist and anti-idealist school of thought:
I’m not sure what the argument is for how the ideas encountered in math depend on material part of reality. There is no such dependency as far as I can see as a person with a background in mathematics.
I am not aware of any Marxist positions that are in conflict with idealism. If there are such positions, I’m all ears.
1: Math is the literal representation of the the laws of matter. Math would not make sense if it didn’t follow the laws of matter that we have developed throughout all our history.
2: “The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature is the paramount question of the whole of philosophy… The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature … comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.” (Marx, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 329.) The entire foundation of Marxism (dialectical materialism) is in conflict with the foundation of idealism.
It is not, especially not in the sense of math as what mathematicians study, but, again, math as an academic discipline is also not that. Math as an academic discipline says nothing about matter. Physics and chemistry (as academic disciplines) do.
In an academic work of physics, you would encounter passages like ‘a body’s movement can be described this way’, or ‘spectral analysis indicates that this planet’s atmosphere has such-and-such gases’.
In an academic work of chemistry, you would encounter passages like ‘when mixed, these two substances enter a reaction the result of which are these substances’.
In an academic work of math, you would instead encounter passages like ‘the annulus of convergence of this Laurent series has such-and-such radii’, or ‘this surface has this Euler characteristic’, or ‘this shape is a wild embedding of a sphere into R^3’.
Unlike bodies of matter, planets and their atmospheres, substances, etc., none of the objects mentioned in the quotes in that last part are material.
It’s the other way around, however. Math as what mathematicians study is not dependent on matter in any way (if you disagree, you can try exploring what properties matter would need to have to, for example, annihilate the idea of the field of rational numbers). Meanwhile, if a material system works in a way that corresponds to some non-self-contradictory system found in math, it is not going to produce any results that would somehow cause a contradiction in the math system, so long as the material system works in accordance with the correspondence to the math system. You are not going to, for example, start out with 2 apples, give one apple to your comrade and be left with 3 apples, so long as giving an apple corresponds to subtracting 1 from a natural number that starts out as the count of how many apples you have and so long as there are no other ways to change how many apples you have.
I am yet to encounter any conflicts in this regard. I have been unable to find them on my own, and the people that I have talked to so far, including outside of this thread, have not managed to find any such issues. I hope to resolve this matter at some point, one way or another.
Maybe a better phrasing would be that math is another paradigm of matter, another way of visualizing matter. Still i stand by what i said, even if mathematician studies are seemingly abstract, it is only because we have developed math to a higher stage of development than other disciplines and thus have lost the forest for the trees.
Math does not exist in a vacuum, this is a big difference between metaphysics and Marxism, things do not exist in a vacuum… Math studies have to converge to the currently developed laws of math or it is not math but nonsense.
“Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.” (Dialectical and Historical Materialism)
I apologise for disappearing for a few days. Dealing with stress, in particular due to this discussion, and with more ‘professional’ stuff. I have not read everything in the thread that got posted since I last replied here yet, and will probably not be able to do so quite right now.
In what sense? If by the word ‘paradigm’ you just mean ‘a collection of ideas’ (where an ‘idea’ is any non-material object), then the expression ‘a collection of ideas of matter’ doesn’t make sense in this context without further clarification.
If you mean that it is some sort of a collection of theories about matter, then there are, again, problems. Math-as-what-mathematicians-study is not a theory, not a collection of thought patterns, research methods or anything like that - it exists independently of our minds. Also, not particularly relevant, but math as the body of knowledge about what mathematicians study tells us nothing about matter without application of the sort that physicists and chemists engage in.
Math-as-what-mathematicians-study is not any sort of way of visualising anything, though. We can use knowledge about that stuff in order to help us visualise things, both material and non-material, like we know how to draw an annulus and we know that a Laurent series generally converges for z within a metric annulus on the complex plane, meaning that we can visualise the region of convergence of such a series with a relevant drawing (or imagine a relevant drawing), or like how we can use our knowledge of the fact that roughly half of uranium-238 decays into uranium-234 within 4.5 billion years or so to make a relevant drawing (or, again, imagine one).
Not sure what you mean by ‘existing in a vacuum’. In the literal sense, it is incorrect, as math is not a material thing, and does not have a location in any reasonable sense in this context.
If by that you mean that it depends on matter, then that seems to be an assumption/axiom that you subscribe to. That assumption does not seem to have a good basis. How would matter have to be different in order to, for example, eliminate the idea of the field of rational numbers? Or do you have another example of a dependency of math-as-what-mathematicians-study in mind?
What do you mean by ‘converge’ here, and what relevance does this sentence have to this topic?
What mathematicians study can be said to be ‘the laws of math’. The study of math can’t be said to ‘converge’ in any sense that I can think of, other than colloquial and imprecise, in which case I’m not sure what exactly it is that you mean.
Furthermore, are there any conclusions that Marxism draws from materialism about society, economics, politics, communist praxis, epistemology or some human activity that I have failed to consider here? Because if not, it seems that we are in the same boat with the exception that I say that some non-material things are non-mental and are not dependent on matter, while matter has dependencies on it, and you say that there are no such things.
What do you mean by ‘material’?Nevermind, I saw your comment below.
I think the misstep that you’re taking is equating ‘material’ with ‘physical’ or relating to ‘(physical) matter’.
Marxists don’t study things, they study relations and processes. So when Marxists talk of ‘material’, they’re speaking of ‘material relations’. This includes physical objects, of course, and also social relations and e.g. gravity or magnetic fields. Money or value as social relations are as material as gravity or a flower; such relations have very real, very tangible effects on the world even if you can’t see or touch the relations.
You seem to be transposing your own definition of ‘material’ onto historical and dialectical materialists who hold a very different definition. You’re just going to speak past people if you do that.
I could be wrong: are you referring to any particular Marxists as a source for your definition of materialism and it’s coincidence with idealism? You say that you’re:
Personally, I haven’t come across a single Marxist who treats materialism and idealism as compatible. Even those who admit that ideas can shape reality (including Marx himself) do so from a position of rejecting idealism. In that sense, just as material does not equate to (physical) matter, idealism does not equate to ideas simpliciter.
All these debates are rooted in historic philosophical traditions. You can’t dismiss the essence of Marxism on the basis of modern, dare I say idealistically universalised, notions of what these terms mean; you have to go back to the beginning and situate the terms in their historical context. That is another aspect of Marxism—insisting that relations are historically contingent, meaning that e.g. definitions can change through the epochs.
I apologise for disappearing for a few days. Dealing with stress, in particular due to this discussion, and with more ‘professional’ stuff. I have not read everything in the thread that got posted since I last replied here yet, and will probably not be able to do so quite right now.
But then what you mean by ‘material’ also encompasses non-material things, which doesn’t align with how the word ‘material’ is used in philosophy. This also supports the thoughts that I have been left with for a while at this point that there is no conflict between Marxism and idealism. Just between Marxism and some forms of idealism that are often presented to encompass all of idealist schools of thought.
Also, can you provide a source for your definition of the word ‘material’? Also, as of right now, I do not understand what exactly it is that you mean by it if not that a ‘material’ object is one that consists of matter (and, perhaps, that a ‘material’ process is one that involves material objects, etc.).
I never claimed that materialism ‘coincides’ with idealism. What I have claimed is that Marxism doesn’t conflict with idealism (in particular, with the views that I subscribe to).
Strictly speaking, my claim is incorrect, because at least usually Marxists do seem to take as an axiom that all ideas depend on matter in some way, but
I do not treat them as compatible, except in the sense that there are types of materialism of different strictness. I don’t think that anybody here subscribes to strict materialism that posits that nothing but matter exists, for example.
What I am saying is that Marxism is fundamentally ‘agnostic’ in this sense. All of the relevant conclusions can be made in various idealist and materialist frameworks, especially if we allow for some basic rewording. Again, at the very least currently I am not aware of any relevant conflicts.
Although, I think that all the ‘idealism vs materialism’ arguments do lack an evaluation of a view that neither matter nor ideas have any sort of ‘primacy’ in any reasonable sense, considering that idealism and materialism are often defined through specifically the ‘primacy’ thing (as opposed to through what is labelled as ‘existing’, which is how the relevant terms are defined in at least some traditions), and, bizarrely, I have not encountered the position that I just outlined yet.
Not sure what you are trying to say here.
In any case, my main point is that, so far, I do not see any significant conflicts between Marxism and idealism.
Thanks for responding. Don’t worry about the delay. At least on my instance, there’s no issue with taking your time, especially with tricky issues that require thinking space. I’m preparing a longer response for you because there’s a lot to unpack, here. It may take me a day or two to collect my thoughts.
deleted by creator
I would like to clarify some things. It is not exactly true that Marxism is a materialist philosophy. Marxism is a dialectical materialist philosophy. One of Marx’s key innovations in philosophy was to conceive of a feedback relation between ideas and matter. Matter constrains and guides the development of ideas, and ideas influence matter through human action.
Another aspect here is that this feedback relationship is self similar. If you zoom in to smaller parts of reality, you find new iterations of this loop. For example, you could find a feedback relationship between the legal system and the economic mode of production. But if you zoom into the legal system themselves, you will find some relation between the material base of the legal system (the courts, prisons, lawyers) and the ideal part (the laws on the books, the common juridical worldviews).
I think it’s more correct to say dialectical materialism is a subset of materialist philosophy. It’s not a dualist philosophy because the mental realm is not conceived of as a separate thing. Rather information and ideas are embedded in the complex chemistry of the human brain.
I think the true utility of dialectics to Marx was that it allowed him to intuit how change actually occurs in our material world without relying on the science of thermodynamics which didn’t exist yet.
Yup. I should have added that part but forgot.
It’s more than just thermodynamics. I don’t think dialects can simply be reduced to science (that is positivism, which marx rejected). It might be better to say that dialects is the philosophy of science.
Plus, marx was well aware of thermodynamics. In fact, the whole idea of labor-power was inspired by horse-power. And value was conceived of as the economic analogue of work.
Science doesn’t not have to be positivist. I think most scientists actually understand that. For example the laws of thermodynamics break down at a quantum level and we’re still trying to come up with and test better models that can incorporate that new information.
What I mean to say about the laws of thermodynamics is they are incredibly useful in describing how and why things change. These were not all worked out when Marx was developing his theories. Yes, Marx and Engels were up to date with the science of their time and they make reference to work and power. However they lacked an understanding of entropy if only because scientists had only begun to experiment with the concept. That’s very clear especially if you read Engels’s Dialectic of Nature. In it he explicitly argues against ideas that would come to be core to the science of thermodynamics.
That’s all to say I suspect if those developments in physics had occurred maybe 40 years earlier, Marx would have formulated a much more precise concept of value. Then maybe he wouldn’t have needed to write so much about linen coats.
This line of thinking indicates the assumption that the only type of idealism is the sort that posits that only matter and ‘mental’ non-material stuff exists. There are other types, including ones that do not consider said ‘mental’ stuff to exist.
I myself, for example, fall under the camp of considering non-material non-mental stuff to exist, in addition to mental stuff. I consider some, but not all, of the former to have no dependencies on material stuff, with material stuff being dependent on such, and that all mental stuff depends on material stuff. I am yet to find any sort of conflicts with Marxism on these grounds (or in general, sans, perhaps, some wording that is used by Marx or other people).
However, why call this ‘dialectical materialism’ if it can just as well be work just fine within an idealist framework/alongside subscription to idealist schools of thought? There doesn’t seem to be any conflict in this regard.
Because Marxists think of ideas as themselves being material things. Marxism is not a dualist philosophy. For us, ideas exist as brains, books, TV programs and so on. There is thus even some interesting theories about how the medium itself changes the ideas. Furthermore, in marxist theories, ideas are not given equal weight to the rest of the system. Ideas are only a small part of material reality.
As far as I understand it math is the symbolic representation of formal logic which is itself a reflection of thermodynamic principles.
Mathematics as what mathematicians study is not itself a representation (of, well, itself), so that’s obviously false in that sense, and I’m not sure how representation of it is relevant to its own nature. And, of course, math itself isn’t dependent on what is studied in thermodynamics.
Where would you say “realist” exists in this context?
Pragmatism maybe? I’m not really sure, I tend to find “realist” just means “I’m really good at justifying the actions I was going to do already.” though obviously that isn’t a definition.
This may be of some relevance:
Cornforth on 'realism'
From 22–24 of Maurice Cornforth’s Materialism and the Dialectical Method:
Thanks for this!